


Managing the Risk of ASF Introduction through Spray-Dried Plasma


Ministry of Agriculture, Food and Rural Affairs (MAFRA)
Republic of Korea

2026.8.12




- **1.** ASF Outbreak Status(2019~2025)
- **2.** ASF Outbreak Status(2026)
- **3.** Situation Analysis
- **4.** Epidemiological Investigation: Spray-Dried Plasma
- **5.** Laboratory Analysis
- **6.** Risk Management Measures Across the Entire Chain

Prior to 2026, ASF outbreaks were confined to endemic areas, with IGR-II predominating in sows.




Outbreaks were largely confined to northern regions of Korea.




In 2026, ASF outbreaks spread rapidly nationwide following the emergence of the foreign IGR-I genotype, with a marked increase in cases among weaned pigs.


24 outbreaks were reported within just 60 days across seven provinces.



The foreign IGR-I genotype rapidly became the predominant genotype.




Genomic analysis revealed 99.99% homology with the November 2025 Dangjin virus, suggesting four potential routes of introduction.



Epidemiological investigations identified contaminated pig blood as the most likely source of contamination.

ASFV IGR-I genes were detected in spray-dried porcine plasma (2 samples) and compound feed (2 samples).

Suspected Contamination Pathway




Whole-genome sequencing identified characteristic genomic changes, while animal experiments confirmed retained high pathogenicity.



Summary of Laboratory Findings

Methodology	Result	Interpretation
In Vitro (Porcine Alveolar Macrophages)	○	No evidence of infectivity
In Vivo (Intramuscular Inoculation)	V	Acute, highly pathogenic infection (All three pigs died within 7–9 days, with severe splenomegaly and lymphadenopathy)
Oral Feeding Trial	○	No infectivity confirmed under normal feeding conditions.

Strengthening Biosecurity Across the Entire Production Chain



Thank You

감사합니다

